gone to Niagara and had seen no danger. They would be safe. Johnson would fill their canoes with presents.
Sixteen Anishinaabeg from the Sault-or Saulteurs as the French called themset out on the long journey to the Crooked Place. As they navigated through the islands of Lake Huron they felt a sense of spiritual unease. They saw a rare rattlesnake on one of the islands-a manitou-and they addressed it as grandfather and asked it to fill Johnson's heart with sentiments of charity. But the manitou seemed displeased, and angry waves later threatened their bark canoes. They sacrificed two dogs to appease the spirits.
The Saulteurs crossed Lake Huron safely and navigated the rivers leading inland before leaving their canoes and striking out on foot. They struggled for two days through forests thick with mosquitoes before emerging at the Toronto trading house on the shores of Lake Ontario. Here they made new canoes from elm bark for the trip across the lake to Niagara. On the morning of their departure the Saulteurs painted themselves in bright colours to signify their peaceful intentions and held a council by the lakeshore, singing the songs that would protect them from danger.
They arrived at the Crooked Place later that day. The sight must have astounded them. On the east bank of the river was the stone fortress, built by the French but now possessed by the British. On the nearby west bank (where the town of Niagara-on-theLake now stands) they saw something they had never seen before. Over a thousand delegates from nations all around the Great Lakes and beyond had accepted Johnson's invitation and were encamped on the river's edge, the largest such gathering ever held. 2 The treaty council would involve many meetings over the following days and weeks. Finally, on the last day of July, Johnson and his officers left the fort and crossed the river to formalize the treaty at the native encampment. With promises of peace, friendship, justice, alliance, security, and prosperity, he gave the assembled chiefs "the great Covenant Chain", a belt of wampum shells "23 Rows broad, & the Year 1764 worked upon it" and then he distributed valuable gifts of manufactured goods for them to take home to their people. 3 In subsequent treaty councils, chiefs would hold the same belt in their hands, recite the story of the meeting at the Crooked Place, and implore "our The task of understanding these treaty encounters as part of our legal history is a complex one. In this essay I will consider only one aspect of that challenge, interpreting the expression Crown as father. It would be tempting to read 'father' in this expression in the sense that the word has in modern western societies. As historians like Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock have argued, however, that temptation must be resisted.
Statements like this one are, Skinner insists (following J.L. Austin), speech-acts that can only acquire meaning through an examination of what speakers were doing in speaking as they did. To know the historical meaning of a statement, Skinner argues, we must "surround the particular statement ... with an intellectual context that serves to lend adequate support to it", a context reconstructed from "the complete range of the inherited symbols and representations that constitute the subjectivity of an age. Pocock, then, the story of the Saulteur journey to Niagara-the shaking tent, the snakemanitou, the bark canoes, the paint, and the songs-is much more than an interesting story. It is, rather, part of the rich and distinctive cultural texture against which the words and phrases jotted down on parchment by scribes at treaty councils must be read including their legal relationships, must involve the distinctive methods associated with ethnohistory.
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Synthesizing legal history and ethnohistory is hardly straightforward, especially within the contextualist framework articulated by scholars like Skinner. Legal interpretation tends toward unity, continuity and coherence. Contextualism resists these interpretive tendencies. Attributing a common or shared meaning to a statement like the 'King is father' is, for the contextualist, problematic. In Skinner's view, history is nothing but "a variety of statements made by a variety of different agents with a variety of different intentions ..." 12 To complicate matters further, the anthropological component of ethnohistory is linked to traditions of synchronism and structuralism-the static and persistent "ethnographic present"-that compete with the diachronic, dynamic view of the human condition generally adopted by historians. 13 In short, if there is a legal-ethnohistorical style of interpretation at all, it is one that strains to contain interpretive tendencies that pull for continuity and discontinuity, unity and disunity, and coherence and incoherence all at once.
In the next part of this essay, I will examine the ways in which the imperial Crown in British North America was generally conceived as a father by both common law and indigenous legal traditions. In the third part, I will consider this question in relation to intercultural discourse in the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada in the 1820s and 1830s, with reference as well to the larger imperial discourse concerning "aborigines" in British settlements at this time. In the fourth and concluding part of the essay, I will return to the interpretive tensions described above and consider the possibilities for a distinctively legal-ethnohistory.
II.
11 Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Ethnohistory: History 'In the Round'", the several regional kings within England "melted" their respective crowns "to make one imperial diadem". 15 The English Crown, as a composite or "imperial" Crown, appeared destined to extend its sovereign reach to distant places and peoples.
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For common law judges, Crown sovereignty implied reciprocal obligations between subject and sovereign: subjects were bound to "obey and serve" the King and the King was bound to "govern and protect" his subjects. 17 The subject's allegiance was a sacred "faith" internalised as a quality of "the mind and soul of man"; it was submissive, reverential and hierarchical, the subject always "inferior" to a sovereign "superior". 18 Still, it was a relationship arising from and disciplined by law rather than one of pure power.
Within Coke's vision of the constitution the "Crown" emerged as a "hieroglyphic"-a symbol or metaphor-not just for a state, but for a just state. 19 In his political capacity, the King was "mysticall", "immortal" and "invisible", omnipresent throughout the empire, and Jones' reference to ningahnon for mother appears to be the root word that Summerfield gives for mother, ogah, with a prefix and a suffix added.
By addressing the Crown as koosenon (or noosenon) in treaty councils, rather than using the words for chief or great chief, Anishinaabe speakers presumably wished to convey a meaning of king that was associated in some way with their conception of
father. But what was that sense of father? When they used that word at the Crooked Place in 1764, what (Skinner would have us ask) were they doing in using that word?
One thing that they were not doing was submitting to Crown sovereignty-or at least the Crown's representative at the treaty, Sir William Johnson, did not think that they
were. Johnson's position in this respect was made clear in a series of letters he wrote in the autumn of 1764 in response to a suggestion that the Indian nations of the Great Lakes region had subjected themselves to the Crown by treaty, a suggestion that Johnson thought was erroneous and dangerous if communicated to the Indians themselves.
Writing to the Lords of Trade, Johnson stated that he had met with these nations at Niagara in the summer, and they had not subjected themselves to the Crown as subjects then. 36 In a separate letter to the commander in chief of British forces in North America, Johnson conceded that it was common for people to describe Indians as subjects of the Crown, but, he insisted, the Indians themselves would never have consented to that status. 
III.
During the long journey from the Sault to Niagara in 1764, the Saulteurs would not have encountered any European settlements. In these borderlands between the edges of effective Care and Regard" so long as they acted "as good and obedient Children ought to do", but officers were also reminded that "as these People consider Themselves and in fact are free and independent" their affairs were to be "governed by Persuasion and Address." 46 Here, then, was evidence within an imperial instrument addressed to imperial officers that the normative force of the indigenous conception of the Crown as koosenon was accepted. Johnson, was adopted and renamed Owanoghsishon. 52 There is some evidence that other officials were adopted and renamed as well. In 1815, Tekarihoga, a principal Mohawk chief, stated in a treaty council that the chiefs had "consulted together" about Sir Francis Gore, then the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, and had "agreed to give him an Indian name agreeable to our Custom." Gore thus found himself a member of the Turtle clan, the "Land Holders", and was given a name meaning "the Great Turtle." Affirming the honour, subjection to fatherly will, at least not in relation to internal matters. The Delawares were told on this occasion that they were to "consider themselves subject to our Laws if they committed any outrages or offences on our Lands", but "[a]ny outrage among themselves committed on their own Lands they might punish or compromise as they thought fit."
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Similarly we find the chiefs of the Grand River Six Nations in Upper Canada in 1827
expressing "thanks for Our Great Fathers bounty in the Annual distribution of Presents"
and gratification for "the Paternal regard which Our Great Father at Quebec has shewn" while at the same time denying the application of "the Civil Law, which we do not consider in force in our territory, except in cases of Murder." 56 These statements should be considered in light of the fact that colonial judges in Canada at this time were still uncertain about whether colonial courts had jurisdiction over matters arising between native peoples on Indian lands.
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The various council records suggest, then, that the essence of the covenant chain relationship-reciprocal obligations of care and respect coupled with a measured distance and autonomy-was still evident in the early decades of the nineteenth century. A father's advice was often given, but not always accepted. At a council held in 1829 in which the lieutenant governor told the Six Nations to abandon customary forms of collective land tenure in favour of individual landholding, a Cayuga chief responded by saying that they would leave the matter to "our Elder Brothers the Onondagas", although they were "truly happy that the Governour has paid us a visit, and that he is disposed to stand to assist us in our difficulties as a father...."
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-a polite way of rejecting fatherly advice. Council oration at this time was invariably civil and polite.
Whether the fathers in this relationship were content to limit their role to that of provider and advisor is, of course, questionable. Certainly they were not above using their position as provider as leverage for pressuring acceptance of their advice. Independent Allies of Great Britain" relations with them could only be managed through address, persuasion and conciliatory measures.
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It would be wrong, however, to conclude that treaty council discourse was immune from the dramatic social changes occurring within colonial Canada. There was an increasing air of desperation in the council addresses of many chiefs as the nineteenth century progressed. After seeking to establish his dignity, saying that although "small" he was "head of many Nations to the North", an Anishinaabe chief stated in an 1827 council:
Father. Taking Father. Stretch out your arm, as mine is long enough to be able to take you by the hand -we are in a deplorable condition. This is the state in which your children are, they hold out the hand to you. ...
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Voices of desperation such as this one reflected the hard new reality for indigenous people that accompanied settlement of their country. For their part, imperial and colonial officials were concerned that the presents distributed to Indians annually, which were mainly items useful for hunting and war, represented a wasteful expense that only encouraged traditional but now unsustainable ways of life, and that Indians were thus exposed to-using this chief's expression-a "deplorable condition" of poverty and disease. At the same time, it was increasingly difficult to prevent settlers from possessing Indeed, it was moral concern about the impact of colonization on aboriginal peoples that informed the shifting senses of the words 'Crown as father' that would emerge. Henry Charles Darling, whose treaty council references to the Crown as "Great
Father" we examined above, wrote in 1824 that as the Indians in Lower Canada were "considered Minors, under the Guardianship of the Crown" any contracts made with them were not valid unless "ratified by His Majesty's Representative", and so settlers could not lawfully purchase Indian lands directly. 63 Darling was articulating a conception of Crown as father in this statement, but it does not seem to be the traditional treaty conception of Crown as koosenon; rather, it seems to have more in common with the common law conception of Crown as parens patriae.
In general, English law as applied in Canada was assumed to include traditional common law principles concerning the royal prerogative. In an 1830 case unrelated to to act "for the benefit of infants...." 65 The common law doctrine of parens partriae was therefore one element of the general legal context within which officials considered aboriginal legal status in Canada. We thus find the Solicitor General for Lower Canada reporting in 1836 that he had instituted legal proceedings to remove settlers from reserve lands, despite the settlers' claim to be lessees of the Indians, because the property was "held by the Crown in trust for the Indians" and so the Indians were to be regarded "in the same situation as Minors" and unable to convey a valid title. These various statements by judges, lawyers and officials show indigenous peoples to be children and the Crown to be father in a sense radically different from the sense of father and children found in aboriginal customary law and manifested through treaty encounters. It might be said that these officials did not know or care about aboriginal customary conceptions of the Crown, and they simply imposed the idea of parens patriae onto the Crown-Indian relationship on the assumption that it was analogous to the guardian-ward relationship that the Crown had with respect to vulnerable children. But if we return to the critical years in the 1820s and 1830s when both the treaty rhetoric of father was still a prominent part of colonial public discourse and when moral concern over the plight of aboriginal peoples was emerging among colonial officials, we can see that a complex relationship between the different senses of Crown as koosenon and as parens patriae did exist. Darling's views are worth examining in this respect.
In the mid-1820s, the imperial government floated the idea of abolishing Indian presents and the Indian department. For example, just three weeks before completing his report, Darling had met in council with the Six Nations at the Grand River. 73 The council followed "ancient usage" complete with the wampum strings and ceremonies of condolence necessary for Haudenosaunee conceptions of spiritual-kinship, but the assertion by a Mohawk chief-"We the Six Nations rejoice in being placed under Your Guardianship, We exhort you to be strong in defending our rights and protecting our liberties"-certainly had a common law parens patriae ring to it.
Darling's report had a considerable impact. Upon reading it, Sir George Murray, the form of agricultural implements that would encourage civilization among Indians. 74 Policy discussions followed leading to Murray's decision in 1830 to move Indian affairs from military to civil control. As he informed the governor general of Canada, Indian policy had until that point been premised upon "the advantages which might be derived from their friendship in times of war", but it was now appropriate in light of "moral duty and sound policy" to focus instead upon "gradually reclaiming them from a state of barbarism...." 75 The development of a proactive civilization policy represented paternalism of a whole new order. But, as Darling's report suggests, old and new legal languages about the Crown as father tended to run together. As aboriginal communities themselves struggled to cope with social change, their own statements were sometimes ambiguous about the normative language being used. Consider the following statements: the assertion by the Chippewas of Saugeen to their "Father" that they had converted to Christianity and were "anxious to be instructed in religion and ... to forsake our wandering way of living, and settle down like our white brethren"
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; a representation by the Rice Lake Mississaugas expressing gratitude for the message from their "Great Mother the queen" that they were to be "raised up from our low condition to walk beside the white man"
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; and this awkwardly translated request from the Chippewas of Beausoleil Island: "We are not Pagans. We don't wear any more leggings or laps. We are Christians. We war [sic] pantaloons altogether now. You want us to dress like White man and be like the White man. We want you to ask the Governor to give us pantaloons … We do beg our good mother the Queen to grant this to us." 78 Particularly influential were the views of chief Peter Jones (Kakkewaquonaby) whose Credit River Mississaugas had been devastated by disease, malnutrition and alcoholism, but now seemed to be prospering in a small self-governing village near Toronto. 79 Writing to the Colonial Secretary, Lord Goderich, in 1831, Jones explained how his and other communities had accepted the "blessings of civilized life." 80 He praised the missionaries for teaching them to "pray for our great father the King" and thanked their "great father" for "taking a new way with us, and giving us useful things as presents ...." What they now needed, he said, were title deeds to their lands so they could cultivate their farms secure in the knowledge that they would not be taken from them, though he added that these titles should be inalienable to "any white man" without a "license from our father the governor." Jones closed his letter by expressing on behalf of his people their "love and attachment" to "our great father the King" and their desire "that the chain of friendship may always be kept bright and strong ...."
These various statements by Indian chiefs used the language of treaty discourse, the language of the Crown as father or mother, as koosenon or ningahnon, but in ways that would have had, for non-native officials, invoked images of the Crown as parens partriae. Jones' letter in particular uses legal languages that seemed to lead in two different directions at once:
towards a great father as sovereign and trustee or guardian over vulnerable wards, and also towards a great father as covenant chain treaty partner and, as such, provider and advisor.
There was little doubt as to which version of the Crown imperial officials in
London saw in these statements. Calls for a civilization policy were favourably received at the imperial centre. The humanitarian-evangelical movement that produced the Clapham Sect had turned its attention from ending slavery in the empire to addressing the plight of aboriginal peoples in British settlements. 81 In the early 1820s, writers like Saxe Bannister had begun to argue that if all peoples were of "one blood" in Christian doctrine then the same moral concern shown for slaves in the West Indies had to be extended to "aborigines" in Canada whose conditions of "degradation" were due in part to their own "inexperience" and in part to "bad governing" and "injustice" on the part of colonial and imperial colonies, arguing that the "dictates of justice and humanity" called for the imperial government to protect and civilize the "savages".
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Pressure for a unified humanitarian policy for aboriginal peoples across the empire culminated with the 1837 report of the parliamentary select committee on "Aborigines" in British settlements. The report famously concluded that "[t]he British empire has been signally blessed by Providence" with commercial, military, intellectual, moral and religious advantages that were destined for the "higher purpose" of "carry [ing] civilization and humanity, peace and good government, and, above all, the knowledge of the true God, to the uttermost ends of the earth", and, in particular, to the "untutored and defenceless savage..." 85 Among the specific recommendations made in the report was that the "protection of the Aborigine" be regarded as a trust "peculiarly belonging and appropriate to the Executive Government", as administered by the Crown's representatives within each colony, rather than a subject for local legislative jurisdiction. of the Crown as protector of aboriginal peoples throughout the empire, if only indirectly or implicitly. In its reports in later years, the successor to the select parliamentary committee on aborigines, the (extra-parliamentary) Aborigines Protection Society, would continue to advocate paternal Crown control of indigenous peoples in British colonies, and would use to this end statements from Indian chiefs in Canada expressing thanks for the protection of their "great mother the Queen." 90 The paternalistic and moralistic ideas advanced by these groups were received sympathetically in a Colonial Office run by the likes of Lord Glenelg and James Stephen, humanitarians closely linked by family ties to Wilberforce and the Clapham Sect. 91 Over time, this brand of moralistic paternalism would be woven with other strands into the theory and practice of empire. 92 On an abstract level, it would inform theories of liberal imperialism developed by utilitarians like J.S. Mill. 93 In practical terms, it would justify particularly aggressive-indeed oppressive and abusive-government policies, like the Indian residential school system, aimed at the forced assimilation of aboriginal peoples into Euro-Canadian society. 94 In light of what happened later, interpreting the statements of aboriginal leaders in mid-nineteenth century Canada is a complex matter. It would be wrong to suggest Peter
Jones was a typical chief. He was both chief and Methodist missionary, and his apparent support for the civilization policy would not have been shared by more traditionalist leaders (whose views are not as well represented in the written record). But certainly Jones' uses of the languages pertaining to the Crown as father shed light on the ways that legal meanings shifted, connected and disconnected over time.
Jones was caught between two worlds. He seems to have been profoundly affected by the suffering and deprivation that he had seen his people endure when the integrity of one of those worlds, the traditional Anishinaabe one, felt the full blow of contact with the meant, paradoxically, cultural adaptation. The ambiguities that characterized the legal languages about the Crown were exploited to that end, or at very least reflected that reality.
In his 1861 book, History of the Ojebway Indians, Jones lamented the tenacity with which Indians adhered to their "old habits" and he advocated removal of aboriginal children to schools away from family influences; with education, he wrote, they may "become useful subjects of our Great Mother the Queen." 96 But were aboriginal "subjects" of their duties of protection and care in relation to aboriginal peoples are not, at least not always, a mere political trust; in some instances these duties might amount to justiciable "fiduciary" duties. 103 But this fiduciary duty, even after it was seen to be constitutionally guardian." 105 If we were to stop here we would say that Marshall followed roughly the same approach to Indian legal status as those Canadian officials who applied the common law parens patriae doctrine. But Marshall went on. He observed that Indian nations " look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father." So, not only did he invoke indigenous legal language ("great father") but he appeared to relate that language to their actions and intentions. The significance of this approach is not made explicit in the judgment. But Marshall's conclusion, that Indian nations were "domestic dependent nations" akin to sovereign states in all but their external relations, suggests that he interpreted the reference to "father" in a manner that was much more consistent with indigenous perspectives than his earlier references to "guardian" and "ward" might suggest.
Marshall took a similar approach in Worcester v. Georgia in 1832. 106 In Not well acquainted with the exact meaning of words, nor supposing it to be material whether they were called the subjects, or the children of their father in Europe; lavish in professions of duty and affection, in return for the rich presents they received; so long as their actual independence was untouched, and their right to self government acknowledged, they were willing to profess dependence on the power which furnished supplies of which they were in absolute need, and restrained dangerous intruders from entering their country: and this was probably the sense in which the term was understood by them. 
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The peoples that form the subject of ethnohistory have never been defined with precision. It has been said that ethnohistorians study the same societies that anthropologists traditionally studied, except that ethnohistorians approach these societies in a diachronic or dynamic light and anthropologists typically approached them in a synchronic or static one.
The societies in question were always distinct or exotic, which usually just meant that they were non-European. In the 1950s the peoples that enthnohistorians studied were described as "primitive". 110 By the 1980s, however, they were described as "native" or "indigenous".
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Needless to say, ethnohistory, in its inception at least, was primarily the product of nonindigenous scholarly interpretations of indigenous realities.
The central tenet of ethnohistory is that there is real value in understanding the histories of societies that did not produce written records or statements themselves, or whose written records or statements are, by reason of cultural distinctiveness, difficult for the historian to appreciate using orthodox historical methods alone. A principal objective of ethnohistory, then, is to find ways of addressing the fact that the written sources of historical evidence usually relied upon by historians provide only fragmentary glimpsesand often biased ones at that-of the societies under examination. Simply put, historians must, in these cases, adopt insights from ethnographical studies of the relevant societies.
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For our purposes, two developments in ethnohistory are important. First, it has been acknowledged that ethnohistorical technique is relevant not just for understanding the internal histories of peoples; it is, in addition, essential to understanding the history of relationships between peoples, in particular relations between the colonizers and the colonized. 113 Second, it has been recognized that even if one chooses to focus on the history of the European experience in colonial settings, ethnohistorical techniques will often be needed, for Europeans were rarely unaffected by indigenous ideas, customs, practices or realities. 114 Applied to legal history, we may say that ethnohistory is relevant to understanding internal legal developments within indigenous societies after contact with Europeans, the development of non-indigenous laws in response to indigenous realities in colonial settings, and, possibly, the emergence of hybrid or intersocietal legal or normative structures that synthesized both indigenous and non-indigenous legal traditions. until we have (ideally) a rich and fully informed account of their history. 116 Fenton acknowledged that cultural upstreaming is in effect "reading history backward", but he insisted that this sort of exercise was necessary "before restoring time to its historical direction." 117 Of course, cultural upstreaming makes sense if we accept that cultural patterns are relatively stable over long periods of time so that we can proceed from the "known ethnographical present to the unknown past...." 118 The basic premise, in other words, is, as a leading historian of the covenant chain stated, that "[c]ultural identities are stubborn things, no matter how much their details change." 119 A related way in which ethnohistory arguably folds present into past is the 'structuralist' tendencies it inherits from anthropology. As Harold Hickerson, a leading scholar on Anishinaabe culture and history, stated, the work of an anthropological ethnohistorian is highly interpretive, requiring the conjuring up of formal structures when they do not appear to exist in the historical sources under examination. We must,
Hickerson said, "discover order where only disorder seems to prevail".
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Together these two interpretive tendencies within ethnohistory, which we may label the constancy of cultural structure and the concreteness of cultural structure respectively, challenge the vision of historical contexutalism advanced by historians like Skinner. Skinner rejects grand theories or narratives of history in favour of localized, fragmented and contingent narratives. In other respects, however, ethnohistorical method fits well with the fragmented and contingent qualities of contextualism. In general, ethnohistorians reject the old historiography of colonial relations, one that focused upon the European experience, in favour of a newer one that treats indigenous peoples as agents worthy of independent historical study, and this approach naturally leads to emphasising differences not similarities between settler and indigenous societies and their respective ideas.
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We may say, then, that in general ethnohistorical method may emphasize continuity within cultures over time, whereas the general contexualist approach to history does not, but that both ethnohistory and contexutalism tend to see relations between cultures in roughly the same light, that is, as contingent, fragmented, localised, dynamic and disjointed.
Into this mix of interpretive attitudes and tendencies, we still need to add the unique perspective of law before the components of a legal-ethnohistorical style can be understood.
Needless to say, there is no single interpretive attitude that defines legal history. But it may be possible to say that, despite differences in approach, legal historians should recognize the following two propositions about the discipline, one negative and the other positive.
First, we can say that one interpretive position for legal historians to avoid is what Pocock famously called the 'common law mind', that is, the attitude (supposedly adopted by Coke) that fails to distinguish between normative arguments about the present state of law based upon historical authorities and historical arguments about the past state of the law.
And, second, we may say (perhaps more controversially) that the one interpretive position that legal historians should adopt is a genuine commitment to exploring within the past experiences of diverse peoples examples of a common struggle to embrace and honour the basic idea of legality. Legal history, then, is, at least in part, about how people in the past have thought about and pursued the value of normative order-how, in other words, they have sought to structure social life by acknowledging sets of rules or principles that provide members of their society reasons for action.
There is some tension between these two propositions. The first appears to insist upon a break between law's present and law's past. The second, however, identifies a thread of continuity, if only by acknowledging that human engagement with the 'legal enterprise' will share some common features over time and across cultures. Like cultural identity, then, we may say that the value of legality is a "stubborn thing" providing a persistent element or theme to the human experience over time.
If we venture down this interpretive track, however, we must acknowledge that we have left the historiographical road marked out by contextualists like Skinner. Skinner is famous for denying the persistence or transcendence of "ideas" through time, and for rejecting attempts by historians to bring coherence to disparate ideas, statements, or speechacts. To see legal history as the history of the value of legality would be to commit an unpardonable offence from this perspective. In response to this argument, however, it may be said that to fail to consider the history of law as the history of law-that is the history of a basic concept instantiated in various ways in different times and places-would be to deprive legal history of its point and, for that matter, its very existence as an interpretive activity.
This is not to say that there are not important values attached to fragmented contextualism. By "mapping the rise and fall of particular normative vocabularies", writes Skinner, the historian helps us to "stand back from our own assumptions and systems of belief, and thereby to situate ourselves in relation to other and very different forms of life." 122 This way of engaging with the past may help us to respond better to the challenges of the present with tolerance for cultural diversity, self-awareness, and the capacity for selfcriticism. 123 For his part, Pocock has written that the articulation of a defensible "[b]icultural jurisprudence" in today's post-colonial societies involves "a mediation between radically dissimilar perceptions and experiences of history." 124 Unity and coherence thus comes through present efforts at legal interpretation that are made against the backdrop of historical narratives that are admitted to be broken, fragmented and incongruent. Indeed, we should accept that one value of ethnohistory for modern legal interpretation is to set forth the range of views in and about the past so that the interpretive solutions adopted today will be enriched by appreciation of those possibilities. power. In these instances, it is incumbent upon the legal historian to make the best sense of those statements, and this will include taking seriously the possibility that rules, principles, guidelines, standards, customs-or, in the broad sense, law-existed for two sets of people independently from the particular utterances or statements or speech-acts they made. This is the unique perspective law can add to ethnohistory. The ethnohistorian may conclude, as Francis Jennings did, that the covenant chain relationship was "legally ambiguous" and,
given its "bicultural membership", it has to be "defined twice. 
